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De-standardising ageing? Shifting regimes of age measurement 
Abstract: Departing from the proposition that in the sociological debate about whether 
there has been a shift towards a de-standardised life-course in advanced economies, little 
attention has been devoted to the infrastructural arrangements that would support such a 
transition, this paper explores the changing role of standards in the governance of ageing 
societies.  In it, I outline a sociological theory of age standard substitution which suggests 
that contradictory rationalities used in the implementation of chronological age fuelled the 
emergence of a critique of CA within the diverse strands of gerontological knowledge during 
the 20th century. The paper analyses how these critiques were linked to a proliferation of 
substitute, ‘personalised’ age standards that aimed to conjoin individuals’ unique capacities 
or needs to roles or services. The paper suggests that this configuration of age standards’ 
production, characterised by uncertainty and an opening of moral and epistemic 
possibilities, has been shrouded by another, more recent formation where institutional 
responses to decentred processes of standardisation moved research and political 
investment towards an emphasis on biological age measurement. 
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De-standardising ageing? Shifting regimes of age measurement 
One key debate within social gerontology and the sociology of the life-course since 
the late 1980s has focused on understanding the causes of increased heterogeneity of 
transitions to adulthood and retirement in late modern societies. Drawing on an 
understanding of the life course as institutionally, normatively embedded action 
(Mayer, 2009), scholars have suggested that the structural and cultural apparatus that 
segmented the ‘modern’ life course in three distinct stages has been undermined by 
forces of globalisation, labour market de-regulation, re-structuration of public services 
and individualisation processes so as to produce de-institutionalised and/or de-
standardised life course trajectories ( Beck, 2001; Gilleard and Higgs, 2005; Bruckner 
and Meyer, 2005; Hughes and Waite, 2007; Kohli, 2007). 
An important feature of this debate hinges on the role of chronological age (CA) in 
supporting the institutional structures and processes that organise the life-course. 
Indeed, in his seminal paper ‘The World We Forgot’, Kohli (1986) argued that CA 
became the main criterion – the marker – for a modern stratified system of public 
rights and duties that included military draft, and access to welfare rights such as 
pensions. Indeed, between the last decade of 19
th
 century and the 1940s, a variety of 
forms insurance, arising from different socio-political configurations, were 
established in Europe and North America to address the risks associated with old age 
(poverty, illness, isolation, etc) . As these different systems evolved into what are 
sometimes known as welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990), different principles, 
funding and benefit schemes have come to underpin pension provision. One 
distinctive and unifying characteristic of those different systems, past and present, is 
that they rely on the establishment of a qualifying, minimum age for pension 
entitlement. Such continued reliance on CA goes somewhat against the changing 
cultural norms about old age proposed by theories of life-course de-standardisation 
(Bytheway, 2011). To be sure, the idea that CA should be the standard for pension 
entitlement was already controversial during the process of establishment of early old-
age pension schemes such as that created by the Old Age Pension Act of 1908 in 
Britain (Thane, 2000: 217-235; also Beveridge, 1942: 96). What can explain this 
sustained and on-going inconsistency? How has this contradiction addressed? What 
alternative metrics have been proposed to resolve the inadequacies of CA and why 
have they not been able to shape contemporary work, welfare and health institutions?   
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In this paper, I suggest that to answer these questions we need to conduct an in-depth 
investigation on the role of age standards in the shaping of life course processes and 
institutions. 
From a sociological perspective, standards are explicit, formalised rules or 
specifications informing collective engagement with objects or persons in a particular 
realm of action, such as the use of calendar years to categorise a person’s age. 
Because standards ‘regulate and calibrate social life by rendering the […] world 
equivalent across cultures, time, and geography’ (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010: 
70), they have become the focus of a thriving field of research, usually labelled the 
sociology of standardisation. In this field, researchers are interested in understanding 
how standards are generated and developed, how they are resisted and for what 
reasons, and how they interact with local contexts to transform social action (Bowker 
and Star, 1999; Lampland and Star, 2009; Busch, 2011).  This usually entails 
exploring the dynamic relationship between cognitive or epistemic dimensions of 
standards and normative, social and political processes.       
Drawing on this approach, Treas (2009) detailed how the increased use of CA was 
linked to the requirement of precision, certainty and impartiality in a wide range of 
classification practices and decision making procedures inherent to modern 
bureaucracies. In this, the establishment of the linkage between the epistemic norms 
of statistical reasoning and the information requisites of State administration in the 
latter part of the 19
th
 century (Desrosieres, 1991) induced a reliance on numerical 
rather than categorical age-reporting. These processes combined together to raise 
awareness of CA and its normative implications in European and North American 
societies (Chudacoff, 1989), a processes that has been reinforced in late modernity 
(Settersen, 2003; Biggs, 2005; Nikander, 2009;  Hendricks, 2011). In this paper, I 
propose to further the application of the conceptual tools of the sociology of 
standardisation to understand the transformation of the role of age standards in 
shaping life course processes and institutions since the period addressed by Treas and 
Kohli. My approach is historical, focusing on expert knowledge and debates about the 
pros and cons of using CA or alternative age metrics from the mid-20
th
 century 
onwards. I use those deliberations as a ‘window’ into the infrastructural dimensions of 
life course processes but leave open, at this stage, how they have influenced policies 
or practices relating to retirement, pensions or health care.    
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In the paper, I first outline a conceptual framework which suggests that contradictory 
rationalities used in the implementation of CA, referred above, have sustained a 
continued dynamic of critique and justification about the moral and epistemic worth 
of age standards. After a small section describing the methodological approach of the 
paper and its empirical basis, I describe how a critique of CA was established within 
the various strands of gerontological knowledge during the 20th century. In the fourth 
section, I explore how alternative age standards emerged from this critical movement 
and proposed a form ‘standardised differentiation’ (Bush, 2011) that aimed to conjoin 
individuals’ unique capacities or needs to roles or services. I further suggest that these 
‘personalised’ age measurements have proliferated along two axes, one relating to the 
‘ideal’ that justifies the measurement, and another representing a continuum between 
proposals that emphasise measurement of behaviour and those that focus on somatic 
qualities. In the final section, I argue that the proliferation of and uncertainty around 
‘personalised’ age measurements has prompted the emergence of institutional 
programmes aimed at establishing agreed criteria and conventions for the validation 
of age standards, leading to a contraction of the space of epistemic and political 
possibilities for age measurement towards a contemporary focus on biomedical 
markers of ageing.  
 
Age standards: From investment in form to form substitution 
In social science, CA is usually considered a simple numerical measurement: the time, 
typically measured in completed years, between birth and some specific time. It is a 
measurement routinely collected by statistical offices and agencies around the world, 
and frequently used in biomedical, psychological and social research on ageing. 
However, most social scientists agree that CA, in and of itself, is an ‘empty’ variable 
in that it does not provide information regarding the behaviour of the individual on 
which the measurement has been made. Indeed, it is only by drawing on lay or expert 
beliefs about how age indexes individuals’ traits that it becomes a meaningful 
measurement (Settersten and Mayer, 1997; Bytheway, 2011).   
In this regard, following Desrosieres (1991; 2008a, 2008b), age measurement can be 
thought of being as deployed at the intersection between qualification and 
quantification. For Desrosieres, quantification – meaning putting in numerical form – 
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is interdependent on a specific type of qualification work that aims to construct 
conventions and classes across individual cases. In the case of CA, qualification 
means that equivalences have to be drawn between individuals of different genders, 
classes, localities, etc. on the basis of the number of years lived since birth, a process 
which underpins the linkage between the processes of chronologization and 
individualisation that Kohli (1986: 272) identifies a key feature of the modern life 
course. Desrosieres’ work calls our attention to the negotiations and compromises that 
underpin such qualification work by drawing on the theoretical work of his 
collaborator, Laurent Thevenot.  
In the 1980s, Thevenot (1984) suggested that in order to fully understand economic 
activity it was necessary to attend to the forms and standards that ensure compatibility 
of values and pricing. Investment in form, Thevenot argued, is as important as other 
forms of investment undertaken by economic agents because it encodes a ‘stable 
relation with a certain lifespan’ within a certain area where the code is accepted as 
valid. Forms such as salary scales or standard time (Zerubavel, 1982) significantly 
reduce uncertainty of return from other investments, particularly if they are objectified 
as material implements (Callon and Latour, 1981). Thevenot suggested that these 
arrangements are both cognitive and political, in that a particular form of qualification 
of objects or persons supports and enforces coordination between economic agents. In 
subsequent work with Boltanski, Thevenot further suggested a wider role for 
standards in that,  
[w]hen persons grasp events as human actions in the perspective of coordination, 
they relate behaviours to some relevant good, the format of the good being highly 
variable. […] When properly formatted, persons and things qualify for a certain 
mode of coordination. (Thevenot, 2006:111-2)  
Re-articulating the traditions of conflict and functionalist sociologies, Boltanski and 
Thevenot (2006) argued that in situations of conflict and uncertainty, actors and 
groups enter a dynamic of critique and justification searching to build the conditions 
for the qualification of people or things in orders of worth, which recursively act as 
cognitive scaffolds to understand situated action and to act appropriately. Although 
acknowledging Garfinkel’s (1967) work in their attention to the constitutive nature of 
conventions, they argue that actors’ moral justifications entail not only processes of 
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sense-making but also, and importantly, require investment – durable, explicit, 
objectified commitment – to one way of ‘grasping events’.  
My proposition, drawing on the above, is that age measurement is a type of 
investment in form, that is to say, a costly operation attempting to embed a method of 
qualification in categories or standards so as to support a stable relation between 
individuals’ characteristics and social institutions at different points in time. Because 
it has become so entrenched in current social institutions in the CA format, it is 
difficult to fully grasp how methods of qualification combine with procedures of 
quantification in the production of age measurement more generally. Key insights into 
this process can be provided, however, by analysis of age recording procedures in 
populations with variable knowledge of age. For example, drawing on fieldwork 
conducted on the 1971 Moroccan Census, Quandt (1973) reports on the trials and 
tribulations of interviewers in collecting age data. One of the interviews she 
transcribes is especially illuminating:  
What is your age?" 
"Who me? Our generation was unrecorded. We didn't have any. No date of birth. 
Nothing." 
"How many (years), how many? Estimate." 
"How am I going to estimate? I have nothing to estimate with. I can tell you that I 
am 60 years; 70 I haven't yet reached." 
"Have you reached 80?" 
"I don't think so. Someone who is 80 is . . ." 
"You who still have energy, you are 70." 
"Perhaps that, perhaps it is correct, Sir." 
(Quandt, 1973: 45) 
The transcript is revealing because of how the interaction exactly inverts the order 
between CA and what it usually is seen to ‘index’. Indeed, in the agreed absence of 
the very apparatus that would make knowledge of age possible, and to be able to 
reach a numerical measurement of age, interviewer and interviewee used a lay 
measure of functional ability (‘energy’) to infer the age of the interviewee. In this, age 
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is quantified by converting a qualification into a measurement. Interestingly, such 
qualification is based on a cognitive operation that seeks equivalences between the 
interviewee and other individuals (‘Someone who is 80 is…’). But such evaluation 
implicitly also relates such equivalence to a specific world, or mode of coordination 
where ‘energy’ is a relevant property of individuals – most likely agricultural labour, 
in this case. These processes reveal, I argue, the basic features of age measurement, 
made more complex by the multitude of cases under consideration and the 
multiplicity of possible ‘coherent cognitive and political schemas’ through which 
equivalences can be drawn in in research and professional statistics (Desrosieres, 
1991: 214).  
This last aspect is particularly significant in relation to age measurement. What are the 
possible schemas of qualification under which it is relevant to measure and quantify 
age? What is age measured for?  To a large degree, this has already been answered in 
the analysis of the link between the consolidation of modern administrative systems of 
distribution of rights, obligations and CA. However, there is a tension between the 
rationality that underpins such administrative action and the form of age measurement 
deployed in CA. As Kohli has poignantly observed, 
Chronological age is apparently a very good criterion for the rational 
organisation of public services and transfers. It renders the life course […] 
orderly and calculable. [H]owever there is an uneasy tension between the formal 
rationality of such procedures and the substantive rationality that they are 
supposed to provide. Chronological age is essentially an ascriptive criterion and 
thus at odds with the modern emphasis on universalism. […] In a universalistic 
regime, it is normatively preferable to allocate right and duties by a criterion 
based on achievement, such as ‘functional age’. Empirically on the other hand the 
implementation of such criterion is difficult and may even be self-defeating.[…]  
replacement of chronological age by ‘functional age’ […]  would be very costly in 
several respects. (Kohli, 1986: 286-7)          
Kohli’s suggestion is that the heart of CA lies a fundamental contradiction between 
the value of efficient administration and the other goods that the State is supposed to 
pursue. In this respect, CA can be thus conceived as a formalised compromise 
between efficiency and other modern cognitive and political schemas deployed by the 
State. But, as I will show in the remainder of the paper, this compromise has become 
9 
 
increasingly unstable. The first reason for this relates to how conventional standards 
fundamentally present two faces to their users: one shielded by the certainty of taken-
for-granted realities, and another where their foundations appear to crack and crumble 
before our eyes (Thevenot, 2009: 797; also Moreira, May and Bond, 2009). The 
second reason pertains to the impurity of CA as convention, making it easier to 
denounce as a manufactured composite of different coherent epistemic and political 
schemas (Boltanski, 1990: 374). This impurity has, I suggest, fuelled continued and 
sustained critical engagement with CA, whilst it was becoming established as a 
routine numerical measurement. 
Such critique, has Kohli intimates, might be difficult to bring to bear in the validation 
of an alternative, generalised form of age measurement. This is due to the expediency 
of CA as a metric. Because it is ‘empty’, CA has been used in the form of a ‘proxy 
variable’ for the measurement of a variety of other qualities which have interested 
statisticians and other researchers. In this respect, CA has worked as what Star and 
Griesemer (1989) have labelled a ‘boundary object’, supporting the activities of 
different ‘social worlds’,  yet maintaining a common identity across them. This, in 
turn, has meant that while CA does not fully satisfy the requirements of any specific 
cognitive or political schema, it has been recurrently collected and entered in the set 
of variables used for a wide array of purposes. Because it has supported work within 
these sets of activity, where it acquires well-defined meanings, age measurement has 
effectively become ‘locked-in’ to CA. That is to say that the incumbency of CA and 
its plasticity have worked together to maximise its practical advantages while raising 
the bar for the development of any alternatives (Arthur, 1994).  
But, as Kohli explains, the use of achievement criteria to pursue those goals would 
also be difficult to implement. There are two main reasons for this. One relates to the 
different achievement criteria that would have to be mobilised for different areas of 
State action, making it difficult to find a common measure for qualifying individuals 
for criminal responsibility and pensions, for example. The second concerns how such 
diverse efforts to measure achievement or need would have to be validated within 
appropriate epistemic and political schemas, and these themselves qualify for use 
within and across a modern universalistic State.  This would be a huge, costly 
endeavour, in and of itself.  Thus, seeking to replace CA with another standard, would 
be ‘very costly’, because, as Callon would put it, in order  ‘to establish other links and 
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new translations [one] would first need to undo those already in existence by 
mobilising and enrolling new alliances’ (Callon, 1991:152). 
In the remainder of the paper, I explore empirically how these factors have played out 
in expert attempts to replace CA with other measurements of ageing.  
Methodological note  
The data analysed in the paper was collected as part of an on-going research project 
on age standardization. The overall project combines of interview, archival and 
documentary material.  The empirical sections of this paper draw mainly from the 
historical documentary data set, which contains approximately 4000 references 
published between 1935 – the year marking the establishment of modern gerontology 
(Park 2008) - and 2013. This dataset was constructed through searches on electronic 
bibliographic databases (Web of Science, PubMed, JSTOR) for the keywords 
“measurement of age”, “biological age”, “functional age”, “biological age” and 
“biomarkers of aging”, “measurement of senescence”. These searches were 
complemented by identification of other articles, books or documents referenced by 
the papers in the original database.    
This paper’s analytical focus on published research papers is warranted by the aim to 
understand the emergence, structure and dynamics of a particular field of research 
concerned with the development of alternative age measurements. In this regard, the 
analysis takes a similar approach to Landecker’s (2007) historical study of 
standardization of tissue culture practices. Two approaches to data analysis were used. 
First, was the use of scientometric tools to identify historical trends in the literature 
(See Figure 2) and, through analysis of citation networks, key papers in the 
development of the field of research. Second, drawing on the analytical framework 
described in the previous section, in particular the relationship between measurement 
and qualification, I identified ‘genres’ or types of age measurement proposed in the 
literature under analysis, from which resulted the typological model presented in 
Figure 1.  The model is conceptualised as a projection of two axes representing 
continua of idealised forms of age measurement (X) and qualification (Y). The 
resulting categories of age measurement are intended as Weberian ideal types, 
heuristic devices that enabled identification and exploration of specific empirical 
cases (Ragin and Amoroso, 2010). It is not a rigid classification of species of age 
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measurement, but rather as a conceptual tool to understand the space of possibilities 
for age measurement between the late 1940s and the 1980s. The interaction between 
the two modes of data analysis supported the argument proposed in the section 
entitled Proliferation and regulation of age measurement.  
Opening up chronological age  
In his opening remarks for the 1954 CIBA Foundation Colloquium on Ageing, 
Professor R. E. Tunbridge OBE, a well-known physiologist working at the University 
of Leeds, asked the following questions:  
Is ageing a chronological term, merely reflecting the passage of years, and if so, 
what years, or are the public right in assuming, as they generally do, that ageing 
is synonymous with senescence and/or decay? The concept of the elixir of life […] 
has long served as a tremendous stimulus to mankind, to higher flights of 
imagination or sometimes to derision. We shall not dwell upon these fantasies, nor 
shall we deal with that other very important aspect of the problem, what one might 
call the political, economic and social aspects of ageing, of which we as citizens 
cannot be unaware. (Tunbridge, 1955: 1) 
Tunbridge was well placed to ask these questions, having been the main instigator of 
the colloquia to coincide with the Third International Gerontological Congress to be 
held in London that year. In the audience, there were some of the most prominent 
researchers in the emerging field of gerontology, such as Sir Frederic Barlett, of the 
Cambridge Experimental Psychology Laboratory, Peter Medawar, then at University 
College London, Nathan Shock, Director of the US Public Health Service Section on 
Gerontology, and Edmund Cowdry, founder of the International Association of 
Gerontology. But, from the outset, Tunbridge extended the audience of his questions 
to include ‘the public’. The question of whether ageing was ‘merely’ a chronological 
measurement or related to functional and physiological decline allied the experts in 
the room to concerns of the wider population. He warned however that such interest 
should not be linked with fantasies of immortality, but that it was related to pressing 
social and political issues of the time. 
By making explicit the link between the research question and issues of political, 
economic and social organisation, Tunbridge was also suggesting that accepting 
uncritically a chronological view of ageing was no longer possible. To respond to the 
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concerns of the public, it was necessary to open up and explore how chronology 
related to ‘senescence and decay’, if at all. The confidence with which Tunbridge 
articulated these questions, while partially hinging on his prestige in the medical, 
scientific and policy worlds, was also legitimised by an acknowledgement, amongst 
the audience, that this was a legitimate question to ask. Indeed,  as Paolo Palladino 
and I (2011) have suggested, the origins of the interrogation of CA as a measurement 
can be traced back to the consolidation of the sciences of growth in the US in the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. 
In that period, Progressive reforms of the American nation, and growing anxieties 
about modernization, induced the expansion of privately and publicly funded research 
on child development (Smuts, 2008; Prescott, 2004). These aimed to replace the 
concern with poor and delinquent children with a scientific understanding of the 
‘normal’ child, and consequently a variety of studies sought to examine development 
by means of serial observations of selected children (e.g. the Harvard Growth Study). 
The concepts and ideals of the child development research movement can be seen as 
embodied in the figure of Lawrence Frank, one of the key planners of the movement. 
A social scientist, Frank was typically troubled by modernisation and the resulting, 
growing disjunction between habitual human behaviours and industrial, technological 
culture. He thus regarded the understanding of processes of normal physiological and 
psychological development as key to the design of beneficent social institutions and 
the management of individual behaviour (Bryson, 1998: 410).  
Interestingly, it was in this scientific and political context that Nathan Shock, later a 
participant at the 1954 CIBA colloquium, began his academic career in the mid- 
1930s, as a researcher in the Oakland Growth Study, focusing on physiological 
changes in adolescence. There, Shock was able to establish that the onset of a 
physiological event - menarche - was more important than CA in structuring changes 
in development (Shock, 1943), a belief he held dear and applicable to ageing when, 
on Frank’s recommendation, he transferred to the Section on Gerontology in 1941. 
From this position, he went onto establish the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing, a major programme of investigation into the nature of the ageing funded by 
the US National Institute of Health since 1958, and whose results are frequently 
quoted as a key source to support the view that individuals age at different rates 
(Moreira and Palladino, 2011).  
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Such emptying of the meaning of CA was also observable in the same period in the 
laboratory sciences. In this, the figure of Edmund Cowdry – also a participant at the 
1954 colloquium - was vital. Concerned with the social and political consequences of 
the Great Depression, Cowdry had, in 1935, gathered together a group of experts for a 
conference under the auspices of the Macy Foundation and its director Lawrence 
Frank, which he later published as Problems of Aging (Cowdry, 1939). In this forum, 
he was able, drawing on the ideas of Nobel Prize winning  surgeon and eugenist 
Alexis Carrel (1912), to propose that rate of ageing in tissues was determined by their 
surrounding environment of nutrients, regardless of the organism’s chronological age 
(Park, 2012). This explained why, 
….the burden of years is not evenly felt by blood vessels of all sorts. In addition to 
such local differences in susceptibility remarkable differences in speed of 
operation of the ageing processes are noted (Cowdry, 1939:665) 
By disentangling the ‘operation of the ageing processes’ from a singular measurement 
of time since birth of the organism, Cowdry compounded the case against CA from a 
biological and medical perspective. In particular, he questioned the idea that there was 
an alignment between the calendar and the various ‘speeds’ at which different organs 
develop and decay. If welfare institutions, professionals and experts were to address 
the ‘problems of ageing’, and to redress the fate of the ‘old’ of being seen as ‘useless’ 
in modern society, he argued, it was necessary to do away with the notion that years 
since birth could index physiological status (Park, 2008; also Katz, 1996). The 
principal reason for why Cowdry’s proposal was to become central to the gerontology 
was because it aligned a programme of social reforms with contemporaneous medical 
and scientific ideas and practices regarding growth and ageing, whereby ‘the old 
temporal delimiters of birth and death have become blurred and natural time has been 
increasingly stripped from the body’ (Armstrong, 2000, p. 258).  
Although it is usually thought that the social and behavioural sciences were slow to 
criticise CA, mainly due to Birren’s well-known statement that ‘chronological age is 
one of the most useful single items of information about an individual’ from which 
‘an amazingly large number of general statements or predictions can be made’ 
(Birren, 1959: 8; also Baars, 2010), there were in fact a similar movements within 
those sciences. 
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In psychology, the work of Ross McFarland is perhaps the most significant in this 
regard. Trained as a psychologist in the 1920s in the US, McFarland’s approach to the 
study of ageing and function at work was shaped by post-doctoral work in Cambridge 
with Frederic Barlett, to study the effects of altitude in the performance of airplane 
pilots. This work led him to being invited to collaborate with Henderson, Mayo and 
others at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory (Scheffler, 2011), and further to his proposal 
that the physiological concepts of internal equilibrium and homeostasis were key to 
understanding differential human cognitive performance at work across the life span.  
His concern with the inadequacies of CA in assessing function was sparked, 
[in] WWII when it became necessary to employ a large number of retired older 
workers in the war industries, especially in the aircraft manufacturing companies 
of Southern California. At that time a study was made, The Older Worker in 
Industry, reporting that older workers, if properly placed, could function 
effectively. In fact, they had greater stability on the job, fewer accidents and less 
time lost from work as did younger workers (McFarland, 1943). The investigation 
showed it was unfair to judge workers in terms of their chronological age. 
(McFarland, 1973: 1) 
In the 1943 study cited, McFarland had been asked to assess the possibility of 
deploying older workers in new functions. Of note, is the fact that such investigation 
resulted from a situation where the age-segregating policy of retirement had been 
suspended, and where alternative forms of duty allocation were necessary. What 
emerged was that the application of CA as an index of function was inadequate for an 
efficient organisation of labour. Strikingly, particularly if we recall the discussion of 
Boltanski and Thevenot above, McFarland explicitly framed this discrepancy in 
normative terms, as relating to fairness, which was particularly acute at a time of 
collective war effort. But war was not the only context where industrial efficiency 
should guide the use of age standards.  
With increases in longevity after the war, McFarland argued that ageing ‘cannot be 
arbitrarily evaluated as good or bad, but rather that [it] must be clearly understood in 
relation to the demands of specific jobs or employment possibilities’ (McFarland, 
1959: 21). This belief in the arbitrary nature of the qualification of people ‘as good or 
bad’ founded on CA also motivated the Nuffield Foundation’s support for the work of 
AT Welford and Barlett in the Research Unit into Problems of Ageing at the 
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Cambridge Laboratory from 1946 (Welford, 1958). Welford, along with Gros-Clark 
(1955), another Nuffield supported researcher,  was particularly significant in 
establishing the view that most of the issues arising from older people in industry had 
come about as a result of changes in technology, a generational effect that had 
become crystallised in CA-based retirement policies after the war (Harper and Thane, 
1989). This further denounced the historical contingencies upon which CA 
measurement was based.  
Social sciences’ engagement with CA was somewhat hampered by the role Lawrence 
Frank played in shaping the gerontological field in the pre-war years, in that he 
positioned those sciences in a subsidiary role to the more ‘fundamental’ knowledge on 
the normal curve of development and senescence (Frank, 1950). However, Frank was 
also instrumental in the appointment of Robert Havighurst to the Committee of 
Human Development at Chicago, while the CHD was still mainly concerned with 
psychological child development (Achenbaum, 1995: 104). It was Havighurst who 
linked with sociologist Ernest Burgess to design an educational and research 
programme in social gerontology in the late 1940s. This proved decisive for the 
growth of the sub-discipline, leading to the establishment of the Kansas City Study of 
Adult Life in the mid-1950s where, drawing on a Chicago ‘community based’ style of 
research, gerontology’s first ‘social science laboratory’ was established (Achembaum, 
1995: 106).  
Two important sociological approaches to ageing came from the study. One was the 
theory of disengagement (Cumming and Henry, 1961), which, echoing somewhat the 
wishes of Frank, argued that the ‘normal curve’ of development and senescence was 
paralleled by a decoupling of moral obligations and personality in older people. The 
other, embodied in the figure of Bernice Neugarten, focused instead on how age 
norms interacted with personality and biological changes to shape behaviour 
(Neugarten, 1964). 
Of key significance in the development of this approach was Neugarten’s study of the 
meaning of menopause for middle aged women, which found that menopause was 
‘not necessarily an important event in understanding the psychology of middle aged 
women’ (Neugarten, 1968: 142). For Neugarten, in the later years of life, age norms 
and ‘age status systems’ were more important to understand behaviour and 
personality than biological events. However, Neugarten also found that at the phase in 
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life when there was most variation of across individuals, there was also ‘an increase in 
the extent to which respondents ascribe importance to age norms and place constraints 
upon adult behaviour in terms of age appropriateness’ (Neugarten, More and Lowe, 
1965: 715), a cultural rigidity that successive age-segregating retirement policies in 
the US had re-enforced.             
Ever the optimist, Neugarten identified signs that changes in the fluidity of age 
grading system in the 1970s might challenge this state of affairs leading to the 
development of,   
an age-irrelevant society in which arbitrary constraints based on chronological 
age are removed and in which all individuals, whether they are young or old, have 
opportunities consonant with their needs, desires and abilities. (Neugarten, 1974: 
197) 
Such vision of an ‘age-irrelevant society’ where distribution of rights and 
responsibilities hinges on ability and need, while, normatively, not radically different 
from those proposed by Cowdry or McFarland, is enriched by an empirical attention 
to different socially embedded ways of growing old – the ‘desires’, in her words. This 
contributed to questioning the inevitability of contemporaneous age grading systems – 
its arbitrary constraints - and to further de-naturalising the life-course within social 
science through the consolidation of the institutional paradigm, of which Kohli’s 1986 
paper is a prime example.  
From the mid-1930s onwards, across biological, behavioural and social sciences, a 
mounting critique was directed at the foundations of CA. It might be said that such 
critique was an important ‘glue’ holding the field of gerontology together, divided as 
it was by different understandings of the ageing process. The critique highlighted the 
epistemic inadequacies – the artificiality - of an age measurement system where 
equivalences were drawn between individuals with a wide diversity of physiological, 
psychological and sociological characteristics. In this process, CA became 
increasingly seen as an arbitrary age standard. The critique also denounced the way in 
which CA deployed an unfair treatment of persons by medical, work and welfare 
institutions, classifying people as ‘good or bad’ on the basis of years lived alone. The 
emphasis given to different types of injustice produced by CA was a function of the 
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varying forms of the ‘good’ drawn by scientists in constructing their critique and 
proposing an alternative. It is to the exploration of the alternatives that we now turn. 
 
Plotting personalised age measurement 
The critical movement against CA was paralleled by the construction of alternative 
measurements which aimed to substitute the nefarious effects of the prevailing 
standard.  As I have argued, although there was consensus amongst experts about the 
inadequacy of CA, there was also keen awareness of the hurdles associated with form 
substitution, as discussed in the conceptual section of this paper. This meant that 
proponents of alternative age measurements had to be explicit about both the 
epistemic and political advantages of their creations if they were to mobilise and enrol 
new allies. This eases somewhat the analysis of a multifarious array of different 
proposals crafted over a 70 year period. From this analysis, two key findings can be 
put forward. 
First, that the large majority of proposed alternative age standards are underpinned by 
the mobilisation of expert knowledge to distinguish, or differentiate between persons 
previously categorised as equivalent. Substitute age standards are, in this respect, part 
of the wider shift in standardisation in late modernity, whereby measures and scales 
promise individualisation and ‘personalisation’ of technologies or services. The 
purpose is, as endocrinologist Harry Benjamin put it in explaining the goal of coining 
the concept of biological age, to develop ‘for the individual what our actuaries and 
biostatisticians have figured out so ingeniously for groups (Benjamin, 1947: 226; my 
emphasis).  As Busch (2011) and Epstein (2008) have suggested, the goal of such 
standards is neither to develop a universalistic measure, applicable to all, nor to rely 
solely on individualistic assessments. Instead, in domains as diverse as 
communication technologies, biomedicine or ageing, experts focus on the conception, 
validation and implementation of standards which purport to identify the combination 
of unique characteristics of persons that are relevant to a specific market, service, 
technology, type of work, etc.  
Second, data analysis suggests that the diverse array of substitute age standards can be 
qualitatively categorised by projecting them onto a space structured by two continua 
(see Figure 1): one relating to the mode of coordination that justifies the 
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measurement, and another ranging between proposals that emphasise measurement of 
behaviour – functional age - and those that focus on somatic qualities – biological age 
(see Salthouse, 1986). In terms of justification, substitute measures tend to qualify 
persons in two different ways. Efficiency refers to the cognitive and moral scaffolds 
that aim to use individualised measurement to maximise older people’s participation 
in the economy and polity, and streamline the use of health, social or commercial 
services. It is usually associated with proposals that aim to re-align instrumental and 
substantive rationality in age measurement. Uniqueness, on the other hand, aims to 
provide the means through which persons can achieve their personal life goals, desires 
and ambitions throughout the life-course. This is a form of justification that 
emphasises the value of individuals’ unique personal characteristics, such as wisdom, 
inspiration, extraversion or creativity. Out of this relationship, four quadrants result 
(A-D) where, I suggest, it is possible to plot the large majority of substitute 
measurements under analysis.  
Propositions in quadrant A are typical associated with biomedicine. This is where 
Benjamin’s biological age, referred to above, would be positioned. More instructive 
however is Alex Comfort’s work on this subject. Nowadays mostly known as the 
author of Joy of Sex, Comfort was a key figure in the consolidation of biological 
gerontology, having written the first textbook on the subject (Comfort, 1956). A 
student and follower of Medawar’s (1952) evolutionary understating of ageing, 
Comfort was mostly known for promoting an approach to the measurement of ageing 
hinging on the effects of the ‘force of mortality’ upon survival curves (Comfort, 1956: 
22-44). His engagement with health care, with the development of new 
pharmacological approaches to ageing (Bender, Kormendy and Powell, 1970), and his 
need to find an application for biology of ageing within the problem-driven research 
policy environment of the 1960s (Ruivo, 1994), led him however, to the view that 
while, 
for a proper account of ageing it has so far been necessary to insist on the force of 
mortality as the sole generally applicable criterion, [now a] new attempt to work 
out battery tests of human physiological age is overdue. It is justified by 
experimental necessity. Agents are known which seem to prolong the life-span of 
rats and mice[…]. It is highly probable that some of these would affect human life-
span if they could be tested briefly and ethically.  (Comfort, 1972:101) 
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Elaborated within a project funded by the UK’s Medical Research Council, Comfort’s 
‘battery test’ was explicitly justified by changes in medical technology. According to 
him, agents ‘which seem to prolong the life-span’ compel the development of new 
metrics for both practical and ethical reasons, i.e. they need to be able to detect, with 
minimal risk, proximate changes in underlying biological processes before their 
ultimate, temporally distant effect – the postponement of death – can be measured. In 
a proposition that anticipates much of what is now understood to be the function of 
‘biomarkers of ageing’ (Kirkwood, 1998), Comfort articulates an evaluative, 
regulatory role for the measurement of biological age, assessing the effects of 
presumed anti-ageing therapies and enabling their effective implementation through 
the bio-clinical management of individuals.  
In quadrant B, we will find substitute measurements of age akin to those proposed by 
McFarland, discussed in the previous section, and which span from strict 
measurement of specific functions to generalised assessments of social functioning 
(e.g. Lawton and Brody, 1969). Their aim is to produce a measurement of individual 
functional abilities (or disabilities), and envisage a corresponding articulation of these 
with the tasks the individual might be asked to perform, or the services or goods s/he 
might be entitled to.  As was discussed above, a central concern within this group of 
substitute measurements is the effect of technology on work and the life-course.  An 
indication of this unease is revealed in a review of measures of age conducted for the 
WHO by Francois Bourlière in the late 1960s. In this, he argued that, 
It is evident that the ‘wear and tear’ of existence does not show in the same way 
and at the same rate for all of us. […] This entails a series of problems of concern 
not only for the physician and the psychologist but also to the sociologist and the 
economist. In particular, the diversity we display in the pattern of ageing has 
implications for professional life. Every possible effort should be made to adapt 
the type of work done to the changing capacities of the individual (Bourliere, 
1970: 9)          
Bourlière, a respected physiologist, had led a series of studies at the Claude Bernard 
Gerontological Centre that compared ageing processes in ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
occupations in France (e.g. Bourliere, Clemet and Parot, 1966). These had revealed 
that while traditional jobs were associated with faster decline in function, individuals 
in modern occupations were more likely to become inactive due to changing work 
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conditions and retirement policies. Bourlière thus proposed that new metrics were 
necessary to adjust the ‘changing capacities of the individual’ to ‘type of work’ 
performed by him/her. This would give rise to work and Welfare institutions that 
would use such technical means to regularly assess capacities and requirements/needs 
to achieve efficient deployment of resources.  
In quadrant C, there is an apparent tension between the emphasis on function and the 
pursuit of an ideal of individual uniqueness. However,  where the ‘common good’ is 
seen as best served in supporting individual creativity and ‘genius’, attribution of 
value becomes based on the quality of subjective experiences (Boltanski and 
Thevenot: 2006: 98-106). Proposals in this quadrant tend thus to focus on the views of 
self and others on their position on the life course, and to articulate the ambitions and 
desires that were expressed in Neugarten’s vision of the ‘age-irrelevant society’, or in 
Laslett’s concept of ‘subjective age’, where personal achievement and experience are 
emphasised in detriment of public, social roles (Laslett, 1989: 193-195).  The best 
examples to epitomise such approach in terms of age measurement are the use 
reminiscence and life review instruments (Settersten and Mayer, 1997: 249-51). A 
key figure in the development of these implements was Robert Butler, the American 
psychiatrist usually credited with having coined the term ‘ageism’ (Butler, 1969), and 
the first director of the US National Institute of Aging (NIA) between 1975 and 1982.  
Butler suggested that reminiscence was a normal occurrence in ageing and that the 
life review could be used as an instrument to understand the evolution of ‘personal 
characteristics that seemed to be associated with age, such as candour, serenity, and 
wisdom’ (Butler, 1963a: 67). In particular, Butler argued that, 
that many manifestations heretofore associated with aging per se reflect instead 
medical illness, personality variables, and social-cultural effects. […]Intensive 
studies, involving frequent contact over considerable periods of time, based upon 
the growing personal relationship between the investigator and the older person, 
would contribute to our understanding of the subjective experience of aging […] If 
we can get behind the façade of chronological aging we open up the possibility of 
modification through both prevention and treatment (Butler, 1963b: 721)     
Taking the model of the psychotherapeutic relationship, Butler suggested that 
individual experience and expectations about the ageing process could be understood 
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and shaped by the life review instrument. These were seen as fundamental in 
providing meaning to ‘the possibility of modification’ but only if combined other 
conventional measures. As Butler acknowledged, characteristics such as wisdom were 
‘elusive concepts […], difficult to demonstrate [and] even harder to measure.’ (Butler, 
1982: 35). In this way, instruments such as the life review alluded to a subjective, 
individualised hermeneutic, and are seen to escape the usual requirements of precision 
and objectification, emphasising instead the qualification individuals construct of their 
own position in the life course. 
Proposals developed in the quadrant D are linked to the identification of somatic 
qualities that enable exceptional longevity. In this approach, centenarians and other 
long living individuals are conceived as ‘models’ of aging well. Measurement of 
chronological years is not used to index functional capacity but instead to challenge 
the statistical norms and normative expectations of old age, and longevity becomes a 
measure of healthy, successful ageing rather than years lived. As the investigators of 
the New England Centenarian Study put it, “the older you get, the healthier you’ve 
been” (http://www.bumc.bu.edu/centenarian/overview/). In this respect, the current 
focus on exceptional longevity continues a tradition of research on the ‘biological 
uniqueness of long lived individuals’ that had been first articulated by Nathan Shock 
and his colleagues in the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging (Moreira and 
Paladino, 2011). Such persons are seen as ‘model organisms’, and are valued in 
research for being outliers, and not typical or average. They are also seen as moral 
examples, embodying the markers of the ‘good life’, longevity being associated, for 
example, in some studies to extraversion and low neuroticism (e.g. Givens et al, 
2009).  
The vision within this approach is that by studying, measuring and learning from 
these exceptional individuals, we might be able to extent the potential for longevity to 
significant portions of the population (Kirkwood, 1999; also Fries, 1980). In 
clarifying the political underpinning of this proposal, the work of Alex Comfort is of 
use again. He argued that, 
Insofar as biology is more than a branch of idle curiosity, its assignment in the 
study of old age is to devise if possible means of keeping human being alive in 
active health than would normally be the case – in other words to prolong 
individual life. People now rightly look to science to provide the practical 
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realisation of perennial human wishes [and] medicine can afford to treat protests 
based upon an interested misreading of biology of human societies [as] a 
compound of illiberal opinion and bad science (Comfort, 1964: 270-71). 
Refuting a neo-Malthusian reading of the work of August Weismann that would 
emplace a moral worth on dying for the benefit of the species’ survival (Moreira and 
Palladino, 2008), Comfort linked substitute age measurements techniques such as the 
one he proposed to a wider political, libertarian narrative. As an anarchist, Comfort 
was deeply concerned with how social norms and political prejudices about older 
people imposed unjustifiable burdens on their individual freedom (Comfort, 1977). 
Removal of the fetters associated with CA could only be brought about by ‘a 
compound’ of libertarian movement and good science, which he associated with a 
precise and robust measurement of senescence. As biologist of ageing Tom Kirkwood 
put it in his BBC Reith Lectures in 1999, this entails a challenge to ‘look in radically 
new ways at the maintenance of health and quality of life of older people [and to]  
imagine a world in which the first thing the doctor asks is not your date of birth’ 
(Kirkwood, 1999: 215; my emphasis) 
 Proposals of substitute age measurements have emphasised, since the 1940s, the need 
to devise standards to differentiate between individuals ‘of similar age’. They have 
done so, however, by relying on different understandings of the relationship between 
normative ideals of the life course and approaches to knowledge making. This 
diversity of possible engagements with age standards is partially responsible for the 
proliferation of proposed instruments in the last 70 years. To explain this proliferation 
fully, however, we need to focus also on how transformations on the way standards 
are produced and used in late modern societies has affected age standardisation, 
which will be the focus of the next section.          
  
Proliferation and regulation of age measurement 
One of the distinctive features of the process of consolidation of CA as a metric was 
the role of the State in collecting, calculating and using it as a means for distributing 
rights and duties. As is generally agreed by social scientists, the last 4 decades saw 
major transformations on the function and power of the State in governing polities.  
This has meant that whereas before the State had a central role in the production and 
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validation of standards, in the neo-liberal era, these activities have become de-
centralised. As Desrosieres (2008b: 12) has argued, the polycentric, multiplication of 
networked centres of decision within globalised, ‘financialised’ markets has led to a 
proliferation of standards making agencies and institutions. This, in turn, has led to 
the need to create systems of certification, ‘quality assurance’ and audit which seek to 
entrust the myriad of differentiating standards produced (Busch, 2011: 201-38). 
Similar processes appear to be at work in the domain of age standards. Since the late 
1960s, an increasing variety of organisations have proposed substitute age standard: 
universities, pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology firms, health insurers, 
occupational health agencies, charities, social care providers, etc. Companies have 
been set up which only objective is the provision of age measurement. Indeed, any 
cursory browse on the internet for ‘age’ would reveal that there are currently available 
a variety of tests to ascertain individuals’ so-called real age, from simple 
questionnaires to those using bio-molecular techniques such as telomere length 
measuring. This has had a direct effect on the quantity and type of substitute age 
measurements proposed. Using as an indicator the number of scientific publications 
focusing on ‘functional’, ‘biological age’ and ‘biomarkers of ageing’ (Fig 2), it is 
possible to observe a sustained growth of the field of research, whereby for 
‘biological age’ alone there was an increase from around 6-7 publications/year in the 
early 1970s, to around 18-20 in the late 1980s to a tripling of that figure in more 
recent years.  
This expansion and intensification of research on ‘personalised age’ has not, however, 
built a growing consensus, with papers instead proposing ever different ‘markers’, 
techniques of measurement, or approaches to statistical calculation of battery tests. As 
the American Federation of Aging Research put is as recently as 2011, ‘[w]hile there 
are several candidates for biomarkers of aging, none have so far proven a true 
measure of the underlying aging process.’ (AFAR, 2011:2). Continued debate and 
uncertainty about the purpose, accuracy, reliability, practicality and safety of 
alternative age standards has proved problematic, with some commentators arguing 
that it ‘has not been done [because it] cannot be done’ (Miller, 2001: 2; also Costa and 
McRae, 1980; 1988). 
As a response to this impending uncertainty, proponents of substitute age standards, 
have set up a variety of institutional arrangements to work on the quality of such 
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standards. These are workshops, consortia and funding initiatives set up from 1980s 
onwards, aiming to understand and enhance the practices and procedures of research 
on age measurement. The focus of such initiatives on knowledge generating 
institutions and procedures reveals an important dimension of these scientists’ 
‘uncertainty work’ (Moreira, May and Bond, 2009: 685). Their focus can be best 
described through the concept of ‘regulatory objectivity’ in that it concerns the 
collective, reflexive exploration of the conventional dimensions of programmes of 
research and action (Cambrosio et al., 2006).  From this perspective, the establishment 
of conventional ‘standards for age standards’ is aimed at creating endogenous systems 
of regulation within a de-centralised, polycentric system of knowledge production. 
This has had substantial consequences for research on ‘personalised age’ 
measurement. 
One key turning point in this process was the organising of the Biological Markers of 
Aging Conference by the NIA in 1981 (Reff and Schneider, 1982). Gathering experts 
from diverse field such as pathology, psychology, epidemiology or zoology, the 
conference aimed to establish criteria for the validation of a panel of markers to be 
used in the measurement of aging. Explaining the need for the conference, the NIA 
Director Robert Butler argued that, 
[t]here are both scientific and socioeconomic imperatives for developing 
biological makers of aging. The scientific imperatives derive from […] the 
possibility that certain age-related phenomena […] may be controlled through 
intervention, [the testing of which] is dependent upon accurate measures of 
biological aging. The socioeconomic imperative [stem] from economic 
perturbations that have threatened the integrity of the Social Security System, 
[and which have motivated] proposals to increase the age of social security 
eligibility.[…]Because of the increased age of the workforce and conflicts over 
retirement age […], we must be able to assess properly the impact of aging on 
human performance. (Butler, 1982:vi)   
What is evident from reading this quote is how Butler refers to the justifications for 
substitute age measurement deployed in quadrants A and B of the model analysed in 
the previous section, only to align them with the epistemic conventions associated 
with biological age alone. This reduction of the space of moral and cognitive 
possibilities for age standards is important because of how the 1981 NIA conference 
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set the agenda for a series of workshops, consortia, and funding initiatives in the next 
30 years in the US, Asia and Europe (e.g. EC FP7 MARK-AGE Programme) . As 
proponents of replacement age standards are encouraged to abide by common criteria 
such as those proposed by the 2000 biomarkers workshop (Butler et al, 2004: 561), 
they are also implicitly required to align their work with the epistemic and normative 
conventions of biological age. One of the effects of these activities has been the focus 
on the left-had side of the vectorial space described above and a concentration of 
research and funding on quadrant A, particularly with a focus on biomarkers of ageing 
(see Figure 2). This entails a reduction of the range of possibilities for the moral 
emplacement of justifications of new age standards.  
However, it cannot be said that this is an unexpected finding, as this shift towards 
biological age measurement partakes in an emerging consensus amongst ageing 
researchers that health and health maintenance practices, supported by new 
arrangements between laboratory science and public health (Butler et al, 2008), are 
key to both the maximisation of older people’s participation in the economy and the 
realisation of personal desires throughout the life course (Moreira and Palladino, 
2008). Whether biological age measurement will in the future enact a compromise 
between the various ideals of the ‘common good’ that scaffold our engagement with 
the life course is difficult to say. Further research is needed to understand how health 
practitioners view these technologies as well as to explore how individuals are 
currently using substitute age measurements to shape their life course trajectories. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that an analysis of the role of expertise and 
standardisation in the governing of the contemporary life course is of crucial 
importance. I have proposed a theoretically grounded approach to understanding age 
measurement as a costly operation aiming to embed in categories a stable relation 
between a mode of qualification of individuals and social institutions at different 
points in time. I have suggested that and how CA became increasingly distrusted by 
experts during the 20
th
 century as a fair and accurate marker of the life course, and the 
sociological reasons why, despite sustained efforts to find an alternative, there is still 
uncertainty regarding the validity and applicability of the myriad of substitute age 
measurements proposed over the years. This contributes to our understanding of the 
de-standardisation of the life course in that it reveals the infrastructural root of why a 
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fully individualised, variable life course might not be yet practically, institutionally 
possible.    
I have also identified the mechanisms that underpin the proliferation of substitute age 
measurements since the 1960s, both in terms of how they aim for personalisation of 
technologies and services, and how they differently imagine the ‘person’ to fit varied 
political and epistemic schemas. This was a period in the history of age 
standardisation where a multiple space of moral and cognitive possibilities for age 
measurement was generated and cultivated.  However, I have also described how 
institutional responses to a decentred process of standardisation have, since the 1980s, 
reduced this space of possibilities, and moved research and political investment 
towards an emphasis on biological, somatic characteristics. This is, I argue, key to 
understanding how current institutional framings of the ageing process might shape 
the range of possible engagements with life course processes available to individuals. 
As health and the ‘obligation to stay active’ increasingly bear on how social and 
political institutions delineate ‘the trade-offs across the lifespan’ (Daniels 2009: 39; 
also Lassen and Moreira, 2014), understanding the generation and validation of age 
measurements becomes crucial if we are to further intergenerational and socio-
economic justice.       
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